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EXTERNAL ISSUES
U.S.-KOREA ECONOMIC RELATIONS: A (HISTORICAL) VIEW FROM SEOUL
By Kim Wonkyong 
the creation of the Group of 20 (G-20) summit as the 
premier forum for the world economy. 
What corresponding changes are being made to the 
Korea-U.S. economic and trade relationship? If, 
through the changes of the last decade, our trade 
relationship has evolved from one narrowly focused 
on outstanding trade issues to a broader and more 
strategic relationship, as I will argue in the following 
section, what are the challenges and opportunities 
that lie ahead of us? This year, instead of writing a 
traditional article focused on the trade issues of the 
moment, I approach the topic from a historical per-
spective, which may help policymakers view one of 
the most important and dynamic relationships on Earth 
in an appropriate light.
Changes in Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: 
A Historical Perspective
In my view, the Korea-U.S. economic relationship has 
evolved through three stages since Korea embarked 
on its ambitious trade liberalization programs in the 
mid-1980s. It started with a period of burgeoning trade 
disputes between the two countries. As Korea rapidly 
liberalized its economy and envisioned itself as an 
open trading nation by the late 1990s, the relationship 
improved. Now we see the development of an economic 
relationship as strategic partners. The following is a 
brief account of that evolution from the perspective of 
a student of Korea-U.S. trade relations from Seoul.
Mid-1980s to 1994: Bilateral Trade Disputes Begin
Although Korea joined the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1967, until the mid-1980s 
it maintained a long list of products whose importation 
required government approval. In the early 1980s, the 
proportion of liberally traded products was around 65 
percent of all traded products. Despite strong national-
When the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) asked me 
to write an article for Korea’s Economy 2010 and 
told me they assumed the title would be “U.S.-Korea 
Economic Relations: A View from Seoul,” I paused 
for a while. Traditionally, the economic counselors at 
the ROK embassy have written these annual articles. 
They usually listed major outstanding trade issues 
of the time, mostly sectoral disputes over perceived 
trade barriers in the Korean market; evaluated the 
state of our economic relations by the measure of the 
seriousness and frequency of those trade disputes; and 
ended with an expression of hope for a more peaceful 
trade relationship in the year to come. These articles 
have been useful during periods of frequent and fierce 
trade conflicts, particularly in the 1990s, and have 
helped educate U.S. audiences about Korea’s posi-
tions on current trade issues. In the opinion of Korean 
policymakers, Washington policymakers’ level of 
understanding of the Korean economy has been rudi-
mentary. If the facts were better known to them, it has 
been thought, Seoul would have fewer trade conflicts 
with Washington. In fact, this was one of the reasons 
why KEI was established in Washington, D.C., in the 
first place, in 1982. My question is: Is this philosophy 
valid today?
I believe we have moved beyond that stage. A lot 
has changed since the last full-scale trade conflict 
erupted between Korea and the United States in 1998, 
over perceived market access barriers to Korea’s au-
tomobile market. The introduction of a rules-based 
international trading system under the jurisdiction 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 has 
virtually transformed the world’s trading landscape 
and prohibited unilateral retaliatory measures, such as 
those mandated by Section 301. The past decade has 
also observed dramatic changes in the structure of the 
world’s economic governance. A prominent change is 
the rise of China’s economy and China’s influence in 
the economic affairs of the world; another change is 
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istic sentiments and demands for the protection of so-
called infant industries, a certain group of liberal poli-
cymakers and economists believed trade liberalization 
was key to improving the long-term competitiveness of 
Korean industries. These people often had economics 
degrees from U.S. universities, worked in the Korean 
government’s Economic Planning Board (EPB), and 
were armed with liberal economic theories and a vision 
for Korea as an open trading nation. They prevailed in 
the fierce intragovernment debates on Korea’s future 
economic policy, and in 1984 the Korean government 
embarked on voluntary trade liberalization programs. 
In 1985, the Korean government created a special 
organization, the Overseas Cooperation Committee, 
which oversaw the liberalization programs and trade 
negotiations with foreign countries. This was the first 
time that the Korean government created an institution 
specifically focused on trade relations with foreign 
countries. Its functions and philosophy were inherited 
by the current Office of the Minister for Trade.
As Korea was moving forward with its liberalization 
programs, market-opening pressures from the United 
States were also picking up. From approximately 1982, 
when Korea started to record a trade surplus with the 
United States, Washington began to view Korea as 
another Japan, a mercantilist nation that protected its 
industries by encouraging exports and discouraging 
imports through the use of trade barriers and subsidies. 
The U.S. government decided to apply serious market-
opening pressures. At that time, the U.S. government 
was suffering from the so-called twin deficits—budget 
and trade—and Washington was inundated with pro-
tectionist sentiment. The pressure led to aggressive 
Section 301 investigations under the Trade Act of 
1974. Section 301 allows the U.S. government “to 
impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that 
maintain acts, policies and practices that violate, or 
deny U.S. rights or benefits under, trade agreements, 
or are unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory 
and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.” With regard 
to Korea, Section 301 had been first used to open the 
insurance market but later was applied more broadly 
to other sectors.
Section 301 was not the only weapon used in trade 
conflicts. Anti-dumping investigations were frequently 
conducted, often resulting in the devastation of the 
relevant Korean industries. One incident that left a 
huge mark in Korean people’s minds was the imposi-
tion of anti-dumping duties at a shocking rate of 65 
percent on Korean photo albums in 1985. Because the 
manufacturers of these albums were small businesses, 
most of them went bankrupt and thousands of workers 
lost their jobs immediately. A lot of them had to go out 
to the streets to sell the remaining albums to passers-
by, appealing to their patriotism. This eventually led 
to a nationwide campaign that asked every Korean 
family to buy one album. This was a rude awakening 
for the Korean people. They realized that the United 
States could be a ruthless competitor, contrary to the 
image of the generous big brother many Koreans held 
in their minds.
Trade disputes were so frequent that it became a part 
of our daily lives throughout this period, with the 
two governments engaging in negotiations on diverse 
sectoral issues, including tobacco, beef, financial ser-
vices, and telecommunication services. These bilateral 
disputes were still limited in terms of scale and sec-
tors, however, partly because from the early 1990s the 
biggest controversies were taking place in, and most 
attention paid to, the multilateral front. The whole 
country was in turmoil over the issue of its rice market 
liberalization under the Uruguay Round negotiations; 
however, the biggest trade disputes in our relationship 
were lurking just around the corner.
1995 to 2005: Transition Period
This period saw trade conflicts between our two 
countries reach their peak, then a gradual transition 
toward a more harmonious trade relationship. At first, 
issues that had caused relatively minor disputes in 
the previous decade now led to huge trade conflicts. 
In the mid- to late 1990s, Super 301 reviews and in-
vestigations of Korea’s automobile market dominated 
the Korea-U.S. trade agenda. Super 301 refers to a 
provision Congress adopted in 1988, and was later 
extended by executive order of the president, requir-
ing the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to identify 
and designate priority foreign-country practices that 
had the greatest effect on restricting U.S. exports. The 
USTR then would initiate a Section 301 investigation 
against the priority countries to obtain elimination of 
the practices that impeded U.S. exports under the threat 
of a mandatory retaliation.
After a painful but successful round of negotiations on 
automobiles in 1995, held under the threat of a Super 
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301 designation, the U.S. government eventually used 
its Super 301 authority and on 20 October 1997 des-
ignated Korea’s automobile market a priority foreign-
country practice. This allowed both governments to 
engage in negotiations for one year. If the negotiations 
did not produce a satisfactory outcome before the 
deadline, U.S. law required retaliation. This second 
round of automobile negotiations drew a huge amount 
of attention and caused grave worry among Koreans 
because Korea was mired in the Asian financial cri-
sis and was thought to be in danger of bankruptcy if 
retaliatory tariffs were imposed on its exports to the 
United States. Eventually, the two governments were 
able to reach an agreement about when the time for 
negotiations under Super 301 procedures expired.
The 1998 automobile negotiations marked a turning 
point. If a typical scene in the Korea-U.S. trade rela-
tionship in previous periods showed the United States 
applying market-opening pressures on Korea, and 
Korea reluctantly and half-heartedly giving in to them, 
from 1998 onward the Korean government decided to 
dramatically liberalize its economy and aggressively 
pursue market-opening negotiations with its trading 
partners. The first of these efforts was the initiation of 
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiation with the 
United States. BITs concluded by the U.S. government 
provide a high level of foreign investment and investor 
protection and require that the other party take serious 
liberalization measures. If this negotiation had been 
initiated by the U.S. government, it would have meant 
yet another wave of pressure from Washington. But, 
amazing even some policymakers within the Korean 
government at that time, it was initiated by the Ko-
rean side. What led to this sea change in the Korean 
government’s policy deliberations?
First, in its efforts to survive the Asian financial crisis, 
the Korean government accepted the responsibility for 
taking drastic liberalization measures as a condition of 
receiving bailout funds from the International Mon-
etary Fund. Subsequently, the government overhauled 
the Foreign Exchange Control Act and renamed it the 
Foreign Exchange Transaction Act. Change was not 
limited to its name. It also eliminated the government 
approval requirement for most capital transactions 
involving foreign currencies. Another example is the 
enactment of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act 
(FIPA), which replaced the Act on Foreign Investment 
and Foreign Capital (AFIFC). The FIPA dramatically 
eliminated AFIFC’s regulatory limitations on the intro-
duction of foreign direct investment (FDI). With these 
and other liberalization measures, the Korean economy 
became a liberal market economy to an extent it had 
never experienced before, and it was ready to make 
dramatic changes in its trade policies.
There was another important change behind the scenes. 
By this time the Korean people started to suspect that 
Korea’s miraculous economic growth had topped 
out. They also felt that their economy was stuck in a 
“nutcracker,” with advanced Japan on one side and 
China, rapidly catching up, on the other. The call for 
a more aggressive trade policy began to appeal to a 
broader base. Furthermore, the creation of the Office 
of the Minister for Trade in 1998 gave a new impetus 
to the pursuit of an aggressive trade policy. Before its 
creation, the Korean government’s primary agency 
for trade policy was the Ministry of Trade and Indus-
tries (MTI). As its name implies, the MTI sometimes 
had self-conflicting missions of promoting domestic 
industries and international trade. The new Office of 
the Minister for Trade was less vulnerable to pressure 
from industries seeking protection and was ready to 
make dramatic changes to our trade policy.
Korea’s first trade minister, Han Duk-soo, immediately 
embarked on ambitious trade negotiations designed 
to upgrade the domestic economic system to fit in-
ternational standards and to open overseas markets. 
It included a BIT with the United States; a BIT with 
Japan; and a free trade agreement (FTA) with Chile, 
Korea’s first-ever FTA endeavor. Chile was chosen as 
the first FTA partner because it was believed to have 
the fewest implications for Korea’s agricultural sector. 
Chile’s harvest period is during the agricultural off-
season in Korea. Also, Trade Ministry officials thought 
that they needed more experience and understanding 
of FTAs before they could engage in negotiations with 
major trading partners. At the moment, they thought, 
all Korea could offer to major trading partners such as 
the United States and Japan was a BIT. While the BIT 
with Japan and the FTA with Chile were successfully 
concluded in 2001 and 2003, respectively, the BIT 
with the United States was never finalized. It was 
under negotiation until 2000, when it lost its political 
momentum and faded into oblivion. It had to wait until 
political momentum built up for a bigger relationship, 
the Korea-U.S. FTA.
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2006 to Present: Toward a Strategic Partnership
Building upon the accomplishments of the previous 
period, Korea was now in a position to pursue a stra-
tegic economic partnership with its most important 
ally, the United States. However, when the Korean 
government proposed to initiate FTA negotiations with 
the United States in 2005, the U.S. government did 
not show enthusiasm right away. U.S. policymakers 
expressed doubts about whether Korea could accept 
the high-level liberalization measures an FTA with the 
United States would require and make the necessary 
changes to its economic system. Specific concerns 
revolved around Korea’s ability to liberalize its heavily 
protected agricultural markets.
Koreans had doubts of their own. When the launch 
of the negotiations was announced in January 2006, 
protesters flooded the streets of Seoul to rail against the 
proposed FTA. They argued that the brutal capitalism 
of the United States would devastate Korea’s infant 
economy, the agreement would destroy Korea’s weak 
agricultural sector, and mighty U.S. negotiators would 
crush the incompetent Korean trade officials.
A core question here is why the Korean and the U.S. 
governments decided to jump into this venture given 
the level of skepticism, concern, opposition, and 
political constraints they faced. From the beginning, 
it was widely held that the agreement would be pos-
sible only with the direct involvement of the highest 
political authorities in both countries—involvement 
based on strategic as well as economic considerations. 
Faced with such daunting challenges, what were these 
strategic considerations that prompted policymakers to 
pursue the KORUS FTA? The answer to that question 
elucidates the defining characteristics of our current 
economic relationship as well as the challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead.
New Challenges and Opportunities for the 
Korea-U.S. Economic Relationship
There are three prominent challenges the Korea-U.S. 
partnership faces today, which distinguishes the pres-
ent from the past. First is the rise of China. The stun-
ning growth of the Chinese economy has brought us to 
an era in which people talk about a “G-2”—the United 
States and China. Niall Ferguson, a Harvard history 
professor and the author of The Ascent of Money, wrote 
in a Financial Times article entitled “The Decade the 
World Tilted East” that “we are living through the end 
of 500 years of western ascendancy.” The notion that 
China has become a power to rival the United States 
is probably an exaggeration. But it is true that we now 
see and will continue to see an increasingly assertive 
China with regard to its rightful place in world affairs. 
Concerns are rising in the region about whether East 
Asia could transform its relations among member 
states in a peaceful and managed way. Accordingly, 
the U.S. role as counterweight and honest broker has 
become ever more important.
Another challenge, also related to the rise of China, is 
the decreasing market share of the United States and 
its lessening influence in the Korean market, and in 
Asian markets in general. Until 2003, the United States 
logged in year after year as Korea’s largest trading 
partner. But it lost that distinction in 2004 and now is 
in fourth place, after China, the European Union, and 
Japan. Although trading volume with the United States 
has increased steadily during the past several years, it 
has not been able to match the exploding increases in 
Korea’s trade with China or its rapidly expanding trade 
with the European Union and Japan. The United States 
has been lagging behind in the race to dominate fast-
growing Asian markets. While Koreans welcome the 
economic opportunity China’s vast market provides, 
growing dependence on China is a source of concern 
as dependence often comes with vulnerability.
Last, a more intriguing challenge has appeared on the 
Korean political horizon. For most of the past 60 years, 
it was inconceivable to Koreans that Korea’s alliance 
with the United States was an option that they could 
take or leave. Our alliance with the United States was 
always at the epicenter of Korea’s national strategy. 
But, more recently, what had long been inconceivable 
became conceivable, at least conceptually. Political 
groups espousing anti-Americanism were no longer 
hiding behind the scenes. They wanted to explore ways 
to pursue a future without relying on the United States 
as the linchpin for Korea’s security and prosperity. In 
reaction, an increasing number of Americans started 
to view Korea as a country that may eventually fall 
into the Chinese orbit.
Policymakers in Seoul and Washington recognized 
these challenges and seized upon an opportunity to turn 
these trends around in one big swoop: the Korea-U.S. 
24144_035-40_KimWK.indd   38 6/21/2010   12:26:05 PM
                                                                   EXTERNAL ISSUES              39
Free Trade Agreement or KORUS FTA. Its conclusion 
would facilitate a mutually beneficial transformation 
of Korea’s economic and trade relationship with the 
United States into a strategic partnership. It would also 
provide a foundation from which we could keep pace 
with Chinese ascendancy by strengthening strategic 
alliances among our businesses, dramatically improv-
ing those businesses’ fortunes in each other’s markets 
and reinforcing the Korea-U.S. security alliance by 
adding another rope to those tying the two countries 
together. After difficult negotiations that lasted from 
June 2006 to March 2007, both countries successfully 
signed the agreement on 30 June 2007. As of this writ-
ing, however, the agreement has not been approved 
by either country’s legislature.
Where do we go from here? Some in the U.S. Con-
gress would like to go back to the old days of trade 
conflicts and serving the parochial interests of their 
local industries and labor forces at the expense of the 
greater good. Korean politicians are not universally 
enthusiastic about the KORUS FTA, either. Opposition 
to it is still strong and vivid. Many National Assembly 
members would be happy if it were scrapped. With 
antitrade sentiments on the rise because of the global 
economic crisis, we may well go back to the bad old 
days. Alternatively, we can ratify the KORUS FTA 
and transform our economic relationship into a true 
strategic partnership that will enable us to be equal 
to the challenges of the next several decades. The 
choice is ours.
To the Korean people, the choice is clear. When the 
negotiations began in February 2006, 60 percent of 
Koreans opposed the KORUS FTA, and only 30 per-
cent supported it. Ceaseless and impassioned public 
education efforts turned those numbers around. When 
the negotiations ended in April 2007, 60 percent of 
Koreans supported, and 30 percent opposed, the FTA. 
What accounts for this turnaround? Koreans have 
come to understand that, for them, the KORUS FTA is 
larger than the sum of its parts. Some of them still have 
doubts about its fairness, but they generally believe 
that its strategic benefits, which are not mentioned 
in any of the FTA’s 270 articles of the 24 chapters, 
outweigh any shortcomings it might have.
The majority of Korean people believe that a strong 
alliance with the United States, a benign superpower 
without territorial ambitions, is the surest way of 
keeping peace and of securing Korea’s place in East 
Asia. That is a lesson we learned from our history 
and experience. When China was strong, or when it 
was dominated by a new ruler—say, the Mongolians 
in the 13th century or the Manchurians in the 17th 
century—Korea became a victim of their conquests. 
When Japan became strong or when it needed a cause 
to unify its constantly fighting warlords, it invaded 
Korea. In the late 19th century, when East Asia did not 
have a stable status quo power and Korea’s future was 
precarious, a renowned Chinese scholar named Huang 
Zunxian wrote a book entitled Choseon Chekryak 
[Strategies for Korea]. It advised Korea to strengthen 
itself through reform and by “keeping close to China, 
creating ties with Japan, and allying with the United 
States.” Although the book’s purpose was to prepare 
Koreans for Russia’s southward march, some of its 
insights are still valid today, as Korea’s external en-
vironment has not changed much.
Considering the state of international relations in 
East Asia today, many Koreans believe stability in 
the region can be best preserved when Korea and 
the United States maintain a strong political and 
economic relationship. Without an active role for the 
United States as a counterweight, it would be difficult 
to stifle flammable nationalism in China, Japan, and 
even Korea. To maintain this precious relationship, 
the Korean government has been truly faithful to our 
alliance. Recently, Korea decided to dispatch forces 
and a provincial reconstruction team to Afghanistan 
and is collaborating with the United States on a range 
of major global issues.
Furthermore, a growing number of Korean intellectu-
als maintain the view that Korea should open its own 
economy and lead economic integration in East Asia so 
that our neighbors may become greater stakeholders in 
Korea and have vested interests in peace. As the liberal 
peace theory suggests, economically interdependent 
countries become reluctant to disrupt otherwise profit-
able relationships. They will have stronger incentives 
to maintain their trading network as well as peace. 
Accordingly, in their domestic politics, there will 
appear stronger business and political groups with 
vested interests in preserving amicable relations with 
their trading partners. This scenario is more likely to 
become reality if economic integration in East Asia is 
not limited to our immediate neighbors. Korea should 
invite Americans and Europeans to come to Korea and 
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to make a profit as well as Japan and China, raising 
the stakes in peace.
Korea’s strategies outlined above are perfectly con-
sistent with U.S. interests. Through a solid strategic 
partnership with Korea, the United States will be able 
to maintain stability in East Asia and secure the U.S. 
share in the most dynamic and fastest-growing area in 
the world economy. From these perspectives, I believe 
Korea can work as an “anchor of peace and prosper-
ity” in East Asia. Korea cannot be a “balancer” as in 
19th-century European politics. That would lead to 
ruthless power politics being played in an East Asian 
setting and to instability in the region. But through 
Korea, the other players in East Asia can invest in 
peace and economic dynamism. Neither China nor 
Japan can play that role. Korea is a relatively smaller 
country in East Asia compared with its giant neighbors; 
however, because of that status, it may also be the only 
country with the potential to gain trust from all players 
in the region and play a reconciliatory role. But that 
is only possible when Korea is aligned with a strong 
outside power.
Prospects for 2010
Approval of the KORUS FTA is still the dominant 
issue in our relationship and the last test before we 
enter the next level of our alliance. After years in the 
doldrums, we are now seeing signs of positive changes. 
In November 2009, President Obama met with Presi-
dent Lee Myung-bak, and the two leaders completely 
agreed on the importance of the KORUS FTA and 
on their desire to move it forward. In his State of the 
Union address in January 2010, Obama outlined his 
plan to double U.S. exports within five years and said 
he wanted to strengthen America’s trade relationship 
with Korea. Finally, the Obama administration has 
begun to see trade expansion as part of the solution, 
not part of the problem. As the ROK government has 
argued all along, implementation of the KORUS FTA 
is a way to create jobs and expedite economic recovery 
without a single tax increase. The ROK embassy will 
be working hard throughout this year to disseminate 
this message throughout the United States in coordina-
tion with U.S. businesses and workers.
There are still some outstanding trade issues between 
us, but none so contentious as those that marked our 
relationship in the 1980s and 1990s. Current issues 
tend to concentrate on two areas: technical barriers to 
trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Issues 
discussed in 2009 included allowing non-Korean labs 
to test lithium ion batteries for conformity with Ko-
rea’s safety regulations; eliminating the home-country 
approval requirement for medical devices; and lifting 
the ban on U.S. live swine exports, which had been 
imposed following the occurrence of the H1N1 in the 
United States. In addition, as both of our governments 
drive policies to raise energy efficiency and reduce 
energy use, new measures are introduced, making 
changes to relevant regulatory systems. Businesses 
might have a hard time adapting to the changes, some-
times creating trade issues handled at the government 
level; however, through intensive contacts between 
the two governments including the bilateral trade 
consultations, both our governments have handled 
these issues remarkably well and are expected to do 
so again this year.
These opportunities and the spirit of cooperation 
may be spoiled if the economic crisis worsens and 
protectionism ensues. Again, the choice is ours. It will 
depend on whether we can look beyond the immedi-
ate temptations of protectionism and fashion a more 
constructive future—a future all of us may cherish and 
depend on for a long time.
Mr. Kim is Counselor for Economic Affairs at the 
Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Washington, D.C. 
Views expressed here are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent positions of the ROK Embassy 
or the ROK Government.
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